Finally biting the bullet on writing something on the 26/11 incident. Why so late? Reams and reams has already been written and said about the incidents. How we are all so angry with the government for letting us down, how we are angry with our "terror hub"/"global migraine" neighbor - pakistan.
A lot has been written about the role of our media too! Our media has been accused of reporting which has caused more loss of life by reporting the positions of our security forces. I don't know if the hindi media is more to blame for this or what because I am sure I was following the english channels and they were reporting the incidents at the hotels with a time-lag of 30 minutes. Whatever you blame the media for, I feel proud that we have a free-press like the one our nation has. Every Indian has been raging mad with our government for the intelligence failures which led to this catastrophic event. And everyone of us wanted to be heard in this time of anger. And I am proud that we excercised our democracy through our media. Our media carried our mood exactly the way it was to the corridors of power and things started to happen. If we had waited for democracy to take it's usual course we'd have to wait till the next general election to make public our mood. But due to the pressure that our media created, the by-now famously weak home minister Mr.Shivraj Patil was given the kick in his a$$ that he deserved, the new home minister apologised to the peopl on behalf of the government, the state kicked their CM and dy.CM, the US has exerted pressure on pak to act on their terrorists. Our media has many faults but this time I am happy that they have brought some closure to our anger.
Talking about media, I've been following what the paki media has been saying about all this. True to their always-in-self-denial image, they never pick up stories which point towards paki elements being involved in the incident. They would pick up news items which shows how indian people are discontent with their leaders, how indian intelligence failures led to this incident, how their politicians blame indian-bred elements causing all this. Here's the big difference between these two countries: Indian media doesn't spare the indians who caused the malegaon or godhra riots, but paki media would close their eyes to such involvements of their countrymen in the hope that nobody, too, is noticing it. We as a country are much more mature and free than our neighbors. I feel sad for the poor people of that country. I can only think of one way to relieve the poor bastards of their miseries and i.e. if somebody drops a big bomb on that country to wipe it off the world map :)
Tuesday, December 9, 2008
Friday, December 5, 2008
A nice, other point-of-view of what's happening about the mumbai terror attack
Army may regain muscle in Pakistan
New Delhi: Why did the Pakistan army do this? First, to deflect attention from the Mumbai attack into which the ISI was being dragged (ISI and the army are very close after Pakistan army chief Kayani hand-picked Lt Gen Pasha as the ISI boss). Second, it was signaling to the world that the civilian government didn’t matter; what mattered was the army.
The third reason is that it saw in the situation an opportunity to recoup the morale of its soldiers. The US-pressed ‘‘war on terror’’ on Pakistan’s western front is believed to have badly sapped the army’s morale. Many of the soldiers don’t believe in it — there were as many as 900 desertions last year. Fourth, it reckons that by playing the India card, it could win back some of its lost credibility and authority among the people. Musharraf ’s last months had badly dented the army’s standing in Pakistani society and the ‘‘war on terror’’ has eroded its popularity. With Zardari & Co seen as soft on India, the army was now sensing an opportunity of staging a comeback.
In fact, one estimate in New Delhi is that the Mumbai carnage, and the expected backlash from India, is aimed at a larger goal — to set the scene for an army coup. Top officials, however, discount the possibility — at least for now, although they don’t discount that the army is pushing to carve out its independent space and a bigger stake.
That’s where India’s dilemma comes in. If it were to flex its muscle, mass its soldiers along the border and tell Islamabad that it means business — as many people, incensed with the repeated terrorist attacks, would like the government to do — it could be playing into the Pakistan army’s hand.
New Delhi knows that the Americans have more levers on Pakistan than it has. But it doesn’t know how much pressure the US was willing to exert on Islamabad. While there is an overlap of interest with India now (six American were, after all, killed in the attack), US’s bigger interest is in forcing Pakistan’s hand in the fight against al Qaida and the Taliban.
So, when Condoleezza Rice came over on Wednesday, she said all the right words but, in concrete terms, promised to press Pakistan on one thing — to ask for a ban on Lashkare-Taiba’s political wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The Dawa is not an underground organization like Lashkar, although it recruits people for terror, as it did with captured Mumbai attacker, Ajmal Amir Kasab. India is also uncertain of the implication of getting the US and others involved in the standoff. It fears that could lead to the internationalizing of the Kashmir dispute.
Everyone loves a good crisis, and all of them were looking to get something out for themselves from it if they could get their finger in the pie. That’s India’s second dilemma — it knows only the US can deliver but it doesn’t know if it’s a good idea to press it for help beyond a point.
Ask any top government official and he or she will say, ‘‘We want outcome, not statements.’’ But they don’t really know how to secure that outcome. Should it turn to the doubtful constable — in this case, the Pakistan army — for help? Not really. Should it insist with the friendly officer — in this case, the US — to make his boss wait and catch the thief first? It’s of no use, he won’t.
So, India waits staring at the various non-options, waiting for a bright idea to strike it. Meanwhile, the thief is at the safe distance, from where he is now thumbing his nose at you.
New Delhi: Why did the Pakistan army do this? First, to deflect attention from the Mumbai attack into which the ISI was being dragged (ISI and the army are very close after Pakistan army chief Kayani hand-picked Lt Gen Pasha as the ISI boss). Second, it was signaling to the world that the civilian government didn’t matter; what mattered was the army.
The third reason is that it saw in the situation an opportunity to recoup the morale of its soldiers. The US-pressed ‘‘war on terror’’ on Pakistan’s western front is believed to have badly sapped the army’s morale. Many of the soldiers don’t believe in it — there were as many as 900 desertions last year. Fourth, it reckons that by playing the India card, it could win back some of its lost credibility and authority among the people. Musharraf ’s last months had badly dented the army’s standing in Pakistani society and the ‘‘war on terror’’ has eroded its popularity. With Zardari & Co seen as soft on India, the army was now sensing an opportunity of staging a comeback.
In fact, one estimate in New Delhi is that the Mumbai carnage, and the expected backlash from India, is aimed at a larger goal — to set the scene for an army coup. Top officials, however, discount the possibility — at least for now, although they don’t discount that the army is pushing to carve out its independent space and a bigger stake.
That’s where India’s dilemma comes in. If it were to flex its muscle, mass its soldiers along the border and tell Islamabad that it means business — as many people, incensed with the repeated terrorist attacks, would like the government to do — it could be playing into the Pakistan army’s hand.
New Delhi knows that the Americans have more levers on Pakistan than it has. But it doesn’t know how much pressure the US was willing to exert on Islamabad. While there is an overlap of interest with India now (six American were, after all, killed in the attack), US’s bigger interest is in forcing Pakistan’s hand in the fight against al Qaida and the Taliban.
So, when Condoleezza Rice came over on Wednesday, she said all the right words but, in concrete terms, promised to press Pakistan on one thing — to ask for a ban on Lashkare-Taiba’s political wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The Dawa is not an underground organization like Lashkar, although it recruits people for terror, as it did with captured Mumbai attacker, Ajmal Amir Kasab. India is also uncertain of the implication of getting the US and others involved in the standoff. It fears that could lead to the internationalizing of the Kashmir dispute.
Everyone loves a good crisis, and all of them were looking to get something out for themselves from it if they could get their finger in the pie. That’s India’s second dilemma — it knows only the US can deliver but it doesn’t know if it’s a good idea to press it for help beyond a point.
Ask any top government official and he or she will say, ‘‘We want outcome, not statements.’’ But they don’t really know how to secure that outcome. Should it turn to the doubtful constable — in this case, the Pakistan army — for help? Not really. Should it insist with the friendly officer — in this case, the US — to make his boss wait and catch the thief first? It’s of no use, he won’t.
So, India waits staring at the various non-options, waiting for a bright idea to strike it. Meanwhile, the thief is at the safe distance, from where he is now thumbing his nose at you.
Wednesday, December 3, 2008
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